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“When, as here, a court is confronted with transactions that on any view are
predominantly foreign, it must seek to determine whether Congress would have
wished the precious resources of United States courts and law enforcement
agencies to be devoted to them rather than leave the problem to foreign
countries.”1
I.

INTRODUCTION

In recent history, developments in communications technology have allowed
international commerce to spread in ways that were formerly impossible.2
Unfortunately for international businesses operating in the United States, patent
laws in the United States have historically only been enforceable domestically.
As a result, those businesses may need to file in foreign jurisdictions in which
they want their rights to exclusivity extended.3 These international businesses,
and the many courts that enforce the rules of commerce on them, face novel
issues wherein some or all of the elements of an action—which in totality are a
violation of that sovereign's laws—occur outside that sovereign's jurisdiction.
On these issues, the courts must tread a fine line. On one hand, the courts
must not allow parties to circumvent the equitable purposes of the law by
performing elements of an otherwise illegal action in diverse jurisdictions to
avoid penalties. On the other, courts must not exceed their jurisdictional limits in
the pursuit of fairness or equity. Allowing relief in any jurisdiction where any
part of the act occurs would allow double (or more) jeopardy. Conversely,
requiring that the whole act occur within the jurisdiction where relief is sought
allows unscrupulous—or intelligent—entities to avoid any penalties for
infringement whatsoever.
The main issue lies in the jurisdictional reach of the patent statute, and the
interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)4 in particular. The Court of Appeals for the
1

Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d Cir. 1975).
See, e.g., THOMAS FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT 70 (2005) ("[T]he capacity of all the
already installed fiber cables just keeps growing, making it cheaper and easier to transmit voices
and data every year to any part of the world. It is as though we laid down a national highway
system where people were first allowed to drive 50 mph, then 60 mph, then 70 mph, then 80 mph,
then eventually 150 mph on the same highways without any fear of accidents. Only this highway
wasn't just national. It was international.").
3
2 STEVEN C. ALBERTY, ADVISING SMALL BUSINESSES § 34.40 (2011) ("A foreign patent
application may be filed directly in foreign countries or jurisdictions in which patent protection is
desired.").
4
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) ("Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without
authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or
imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor,
infringes the patent.").
2
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Federal Circuit recently held that negotiations between United States corporations
in a foreign jurisdiction could constitute an offer for sale within the United States
when delivery is to take place in the United States.5 This note analyzes this
holding in light of current policy—in particular, whether it squares with the
customary construction of the statute's language, international law and the World
Trade Organization’s Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights ("TRIPs Agreement"), and the root policy justifications for the
United States patent code.
II.

HISTORY

A. Section 271 and Offers for Sale Within the United States
Within the United States only making, using, or selling of a patented article
could constitute infringement until 1993, when the United States became a party
to the TRIPs Agreement.6 After 1993, 35 U.S.C. § 271 was modified to include
offers for sale.7 The reasons for this change include a desire to harmonize aspects
of patent law between the United States and other members of the TRIPs
Agreement,8 the majority of which already considered an offer for sale of a
patented product to be infringement.9

5

Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d
1296, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that an “offer made in Norway by alleged infringer, a United
States company, to another United States company to sell a drilling rig within the United States,
for delivery and use within the United States, constituted an offer to sell within the United States
under the statute defining infringing conduct as including an offer to sell a patented invention
within the United States . . . .”).
6
Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1251 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Before the
TRIPS agreements, § 271(a) granted the patent holder the right to exclude others only from
‘making, using or selling the patented invention throughout the United States.’ This court had
construed this grant strictly . . . [and offers for sale did not constitute infringement].”).
7
Id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 103–826, pt. 1, at 5 (1994) (“The patent subtitle provides
NAFTA-consistent treatment of inventive activity occurring in WTO member countries for
purposes of establishing the date of invention; amends the definition of infringing activity to
include offers for sale and importation of a patented good; modifies the term of patent protection
to 20 years from filing; and establishes a provisional patent application system and a right of
internal priority for patent applications filed originally in the United States . . . .”) (emphasis
added).
8
See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 103–826, pt. 1, at 10 (1994) (statutory alterations “[e]stablish[] a
three-year work program to develop detailed definitions for harmonizing rules of origin among
countries, the results of which will be annexed to the Agreement.”).
9
See, e.g., Gerber Garment Tech. Inc. v. Lectra Sys. Ltd., [1995] 13 R.P.C. 383 (United
Kingdom Patents Court) 411–12 (appeal taken from Gerber); See also, e.g., Antwerp Commercial
Court, Belgium, 11 June 2010, Case no. A/08/06919 (Belg.), available at
http://www.eplawpatentblog.com/2010/July/BE%20%20Kh%20Apen%2011%2006%202010%20-%20Ajinomoto%20-%20Helm%20-
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Once § 271(a) became a part of the patent statute, the question remained how
best to interpret the language. The analysis of § 271(a) is dissimilar from most
statutory analysis in that international decisions may be given more deference.
For example, United States courts may use foreign law as an aid in interpretation
when the domestic statute in question was enacted pursuant to an international
treaty designed to harmonize the laws of the signatory countries. 10 TRIPs is such
an agreement,11 so the decisions of foreign courts can be analyzed by our own
courts; however, the courts of the United States have been inconsistent in the
application of foreign law in this area.12
In addition to harmonizing patent laws between countries,13 § 271(a) satisfies
domestic goals. In particular, § 271(a) prevents a competitor from “generating
interest in a potential infringing product to the commercial detriment of the
rightful patentee.”14 Such interest can be harmful to the patentee even where
infringing products are not actually sold.15 In passing § 271(a), Congress has
decided to increase the scope of protection for patent holders.
B. Case Law Before Transocean
Analysis of § 271(a) with respect to offers for sale is somewhat inadequate
due to the limited time since its enactment. Many of the cases that modern courts
must rely on are rooted in a patent statute, which did not include infringing offers
for sale. These cases may still be relied on to inform us about general policy
%20bacterie%5B1%5D.pdf
(English
translation
available
at
http://www.eplawpatentblog.com/eplaw/2010/07/be-ajinomoto-v-helm-et-al-process-forproducing-llysine-by-fermentation.html#more); Law. No. 24572 art. 8(a), Oct. 23, 1995, [XLIVD]
A.D.L.A
5892
(Arg.),
available
at
http://www.jpo.go.jp/shiryou_e/s_sonota_e/fips_e/pdf/argentine_e/e_tokkyo.pdf (providing patent
laws for Argentina).
10
Edward Lee, The New Canon: Using or Misusing Foreign Law to Decide Domestic
Intellectual Property Claims, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 18–19 (2005) (“Another justification for
allowing courts to consider foreign law is to achieve greater harmonization and uniformity among
different IP laws. . . . Of all the reasons for allowing domestic courts to rely on foreign laws in
domestic IP cases, this is the most controversial. It rests on the substantive policy choice that
harmonization of IP laws is the preferred goal among countries.”) (footnote omitted).
11
See H.R. REP. No. 103-826, at 10.
12
See, e.g., JEFFERY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT
(2007).
13
See H.R. REP. No. 103-826, at 10.
14
3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
15
Gerber Garment Tech. Inc. v. Lectra Sys. Ltd., [1995] 13 RPC 383 (United Kingdom Patent
Courts) 384–85 (appeal taken from Gerber) (“[S]econdary loss might consist of sales of
unpatented articles which went with the patented item as a commercial matter, and also such loss
as the patentee could establish as resulting from the infringer having established a commercial
‘bridgehead’ or ‘springboard’ before the expiry of the patent.”)
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decisions. The evolution of the United States' views on extraterritoriality began
before the TRIPs Agreement and continues to this day.16
1. Case Law Before Transocean, and Before TRIPs
Extraterritoriality in the United States generally has developed in the last 100
years. The traditional view, that legislation is assumed to apply only to those acts
occurring within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, proved
cumbersome to Justice Holmes as early as 1911, when his opinion expanded the
scope of territorial jurisdiction to include anyone who had been within the
territory sometime around the time of an alleged crime.17 The Court expanded the
scope of the Strassheim decision in 1927, adding that when “conspiring was
directed to violation of the United States law within the United States, by men
within and without it . . . . [A]ll are guilty of the offense of conspiring to violate
the United States law whether they are in or out of the country.”18 Beginning in
the 1960s, several of the courts of appeals introduced a list of five guiding
principles that may be applied to exert extraterritorial jurisdiction.19
There are two primary extraterritoriality decisions regarding the patent statute
particularly prior to enactment of the § 271(a) prohibition on offers for sale. In
both of these cases, the courts held that the infringing action must actually occur
within the United States. However, in contrast to Transocean, both of these
actions were responses to actual sales, not just the offer; the record remains
regrettably silent on which elements of an offer for sale constitute the action that
must take place within the United States.
In Dowagiac, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he right conferred by a patent
under our law is confined to the United States and its territories.”20 A merchant,
16

As the reader will appreciate upon reading this section, extraterritoriality is more easily
justified when the patent laws of all nations are harmonized. The harmonizing effects of the
TRIPs agreement modified 35 U.S.C. § 271 and judges warmed to extraterritoriality. It remains to
be seen whether the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act will give rise to even broader assertions of
extraterritorial jurisdiction. See infra note 103. At the time of this writing the Act has not been in
effect long enough to determine those effects.
17
Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 286 (1911) (“[W]hen, as here, it appears that the
[defendant] was in the state in the neighborhood of the time alleged, it is enough [to support
jurisdiction].”).
18
Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 620 (1927).
19
United States v. Smith, 680 F.2d 255, 257 (1st Cir. 1982); United States v. Pizzarusso, 388
F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1968); Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882, 885 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 884 (1967); Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545, 549 (9th Cir. 1961). These decisions
all cite, either directly or indirectly, Harvard Research in International Law, Jurisdiction with
Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT’L L. 435, 445 (Supp. 1935) [hereinafter Harvard Research].
20
Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 650 (1915); see also Brown v.
Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183, 195 (1857); Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc., 375 F.3d 1113, 1117 (Fed.

[3:80 2012]

Extraterritoriality of the Patent Statute:
An Analysis of the Federal Circuit's Decision
in Transocean v. Maersk

86

Minnesota Moline Plow, unknowingly sold patented drill shoes within the United
States that had been manufactured by other parties.21 The customers were in both
the United States and Canada, but the Court only dealt with sales that were
completed within the United States.22 The Court decided that in this case the
place of sale was the controlling factor but failed to describe the process that is
used to determine where that place is.23
In Deepsouth, the defendant Laitram Corporation produced unassembled
components which, when assembled, would comprise patented machines.24 The
Supreme Court held that “[o]ur patent system makes no claim to extraterritorial
effect,” and furthermore advised companies whose products may be used abroad
to prosecute patents in all those jurisdictions wherein their products may be
used.25
Some commentators have extrapolated from these decisions that “activities
outside the United States are outside the scope of the patent.”26 As we will see
later in this work, the decision in Transocean contradicts this former
understanding as well as the holdings of Dowagiac and Deepsouth courts.27
2. Case Law Before Transocean, but After TRIPs
The TRIPs Agreement sets a baseline level of harmonized patent laws
between parties to the agreement, enforceable by sanctions at the WTO.28 In 1994
the United States implemented the TRIPs Agreement, in part by stating that offers

Cir. 2004).
21
Dowagiac, 235 U.S. at 643.
22
Id. at 650 (“Some of the drills, about 261, sold by the defendants, were sold in Canada, no
part of the transaction occurring within the United States, and as to them there could be no
recovery of either profits or damages.”) As this decision was handed down before the TRIPs
agreement and subsequent modification of § 271(a), it is unclear whether the Dowagiac court
would have held that an offer, made by a party in the United States to a Canadian customer, would
violate the current statute.
23
Id. at 650 (“The place of sale is therefore of controlling importance here.” The Dowagiac
court does not elaborate on which element of a sale is controlling.).
24
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 518 (1972).
25
Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 531 (1972) (“To the degree that the inventor needs protection in
markets other than those of this country, the wording of 35 U.S.C. [§§] 154 and 271 reveals a
congressional intent to have him seek it abroad through patents secured in countries where his
goods are being used. Respondent holds foreign patents; it does not adequately explain why it
does not avail itself of them.”).
26
3 R. CARL MOY, MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS § 12:11 (4th ed. 2011).
27
See infra Part III.E.
28
KINNEY & LANGE, PA, Copyright Protection Under the WTO Agreement, in INTELL. PROP.
L. BUS. LAW. § 14:16 (2010 ed.).
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for sale constitute infringement in 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).29 This change to the statute
contradicted the perception among jurists that an offer for sale could not
constitute infringement.30
Interpreting this new clause, at least with respect to offers for sale between
transnational companies, requires us to determine what the elements of an offer
for sale are, and which or how many of them must occur within a sovereign
territory in order to satisfy that the offer for sale occurred within its jurisdiction.
Requiring all the elements to occur within a jurisdiction allows for inequitable
advantages, and requiring none of the elements to occur within that jurisdiction
allows for double jeopardy.31
a. Recent Long-Arm Decisions Support a Finding of Equivalence Between
Location of Injury and Location of Infringement.
Recent decisions regarding long arm statutes, once contentious but now
established law, may provide some guidance. An acutely relevant case involved
Penguin Books, a New York publisher, which attempted to utilize a New York
long arm statute to compel a corporation in Oregon and Arizona to New York's
courts.32 The New York statute allowed for long-arm jurisdiction when “the
defendant is alleged to have committed a tortious act outside the State that caused,
and reasonably should have been expected by the putative defendant to cause,
injury to a person or property within the State.”33 The second circuit was forced
to decide, much as the Federal Circuit was in Transocean, whether the situs of the
injury was (1) the situs of the infringing activity, (2) the situs of the plaintiff, or
(3) the situs of the intellectual property.34 The court in Penguin Group adopted
the first definition of the three, holding that the location of the injury is equivalent
to the situs of the infringing activity.

29

35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
Judge Learned Hand once wrote that “If [an offer for sale] injures the plaintiff, though never
performed, perhaps it is a wrong, like a slander upon his title; but certainly it is not an
infringement of the patent.” Van Kannell Revolving Door Co. v. Revolving Door & Fixture Co.,
293 F. 261, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1920).
31
See supra Part I (discussing that inequitable advantages accrue to businesses who perform
some steps of infringing activities overseas to avoid infringement suits, while multiple jeopardy
may occur where different nations select different parts of the offer for sale as the actus reus in
offer-for-sale suits).
32
Penguin Grp. USA Inc. v. Am. Buddha, 609 F.3d 30, 32 (2d Cir. 2010).
33
Id. at 32.
34
Id.
30
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b. Offer for Sale is Defined by Federal Law — “any communication
generating interest.”
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit defined the location of an offer
for sale for the first time in 3D Systems, Inc. v. Aarotech Laboratories., Inc., 160
F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1998), and held that an offer for sale is defined by
federal statute, rather than the laws of the jurisdiction or jurisdictions in which the
offer allegedly occurred.35 Unfortunately the federal statute defines what
conditions create an offer for sale, but is silent with respect to where that sale
occurred.36
Turning then to judicial interpretation of the statute, any
communication “generating interest in a potential infringing product to the
commercial detriment of the rightful patentee” will constitute an offer to sell
under § 271(a).37 This language has two deficiencies. First, it is silent as to the
location at which the interest is generated, and second, it creates yet another
possible answer to the question of where the offer for sale occurred: any location
in which such an interest is generated. The 3D Systems court had no need to
resolve these issues, as all elements of that suit occurred within the United States.
c. Issue of Whether Foreign Law is Precedential Remains Unsettled.
While the Federal Circuit has ruled on a small number of § 271(a) offers for
sale, foreign decisions are much more plentiful, and if precedential, provide a
wealth of knowledge. Unfortunately, whether foreign cases provide persuasive
precedent on this statute remains unclear—federal law, especially in the realm of
intellectual property, is unsettled on this issue.38 The Supreme Court has further
muddied the waters regarding the application of foreign jurisprudence to domestic
statutes by occasionally applying foreign law, but never enunciating its criteria for
doing so.39 As a result, litigants cannot know whether they may rely on foreign
35

3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Akro
Corp. v. Luker, 45 F.3d 1541, 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (stating that the federal circuit should use “the
law of the Federal Circuit, rather than that of the regional circuit in which the case arose, when we
determine whether the district court properly declined to exercise personal jurisdiction over an
out-of-state accused infringer”).
36
35 U.S.C. § 271(i) (2006) (“As used in this section, an ‘offer for sale’ or an ‘offer to sell’ by
a person other than the patentee or any assignee of the patentee, is that in which the sale will occur
before the expiration of the term of the patent.”).
37
3D Sys., Inc., 160 F.3d at 1379.
38
See, e.g., Lee, supra note 10, at 4. (“The legacy of the development of several hundred years
of territorial IP laws is that the likelihood of a change to a uniform world IP system is virtually
nil.” However, new sections, especially those predicated on an attempt at intellectual property law
harmonization such as § 271, may be more appropriate for the application of foreign persuasive
precedent).
39
Compare Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (relying on law from the European Union)
with Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003) (refusing to apply a similar
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precedent, and they face substantial uncertainty in the courtroom and in their
everyday business transactions.40
d. “On sale” Analysis is Not Applicable to “Offer for Sale” Problems.
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2008), the “on sale” bar of the patent statute, uses similar
terms to § 271(a), and it is tempting— though ultimately inappropriate—to apply
the abundance of statutory construction that has taken place with respect to §
102(b) to the newer, less explored § 271(a).41 The Federal Circuit in 3D Systems
declined to use the federal interpretation of “on sale” from 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) to
define an offer for sale under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), citing unrelated policy
underlying the two sections.42 The policies underlying § 102(b) include
preventing patentees from
commercializ[ing] their inventions while deferring the beginning
of the statutory patent term, encouraging prompt and widespread
disclosure of inventions to the public, discouraging the removal of
inventions from the public domain when the public has come to
rely on their ready availability, and giving investors a reasonable
period to discern the potential value of an invention.43
This has nothing to do with § 271(a)'s prohibitions against making, using, offering
to sell, or selling.44 “Thus, 'offer to sell' under § 271 cannot be treated as
equivalent to 'on sale' under § 102(b).”45
III.

TRANSOCEAN V. MAERSK SUMMARY AND HOLDINGS

Against this backdrop of uncertainty, the Federal Circuit heard Transocean.
The cases discussed in detail above tell us that in order to determine the place of
sale we cannot use state law, we may or may not be able to use foreign law, and
federal statute does not define the location of the offer for sale.

precedent even though both cases were decided in the same session).
40
See, e.g., Lee, supra note 10, at 7 (“Thus far, U.S. courts have failed to articulate any guiding
principles for deciding when foreign law may be relevant to a domestic case.”).
41
Cf. 60 AM. JUR. 2D Patents § 269 (2011). Logically, it makes sense that a patent that has
been “on sale” will have been “offered for sale.” While not equivalent statements under the law of
contracts, one would expect significant similarities. Ultimately, this comparison is inappropriate
given the different legislative histories.
42
3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
43
Id. n.4.
44
Id.
45
Id.
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A. Facts
In the Transocean case, Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling
(“Transocean”) was the holder of three patents with the same specification:
patents 6,068,069 (“the '069 patent”), 6,047,781 (“the '781 patent”), and
6,085,851 (“the ‘851 patent”).46 The ‘069 patent and the ‘781 patent both
protected a derrick with more than one advancing station for lowering
components to the seabed and assembling the drilling string.47 The additional
advancing station allowed Transocean’s rig to perform drilling tasks in parallel
rather than in series as done by the prior art, which “significantly decrease[d] the
time required to complete a borehole.” 48
In 2005, Maersk A/S, a Danish company, had a rig built by Keppel FELS in
Singapore that fell within the scope of the '069 and '781 patents.49 Maersk USA, a
U.S. corporation, subsequently negotiated the sale of the rig to Statoil Gulf of
Mexico, LLC (“Statoil”), another U.S. corporation.50 The negotiations for the
sale took place in Norway.51 The contract for sale specified that the rig's
operating area primarily included the United States owned Gulf of Mexico.52
The contract between Maersk USA and Statoil allowed Maersk to modify the
rig in order to comply with “court or administrative determinations throughout the
world.”53 When a district court judge in the United States found that a Global
Santa Fe ship with a similar design infringed the Transocean patents and ordered
Global Santa Fe to install a casing sleeve to disable its ability to use a second drill
string, Maersk modified the Statoil rig as well.54 The modifications were made
before the rig was delivered to the United States.55 As a result, the Court had to
determine whether the modification of the rig prior to its delivery eliminated the
plaintiff's cause of action for an offer for sale.

46

Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d
1296, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
47
Id. at 1301.
48
Id. at 1301–02.
49
Id. at 1307.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d
1296, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
53
Id.
54
Id. (citing Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc., v. GlobalSantaFe Corp., No. H-032910, 2006 WL 3813778 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006)).
55
Transocean, 617 F.3d at 1307.
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B. Main Issue - What Actions Constitute an Offer to Sell Within the United
States?
The interpretation of an offer for sale, raised in Transocean, is an issue never
before satisfactorily resolved.56 Section 271(a) of the patent statute reads:
“Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes,
uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or
imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent
therefor, infringes the patent.”57
1. Disambiguation of § 271(a)
An initial reading of § 271(a) reveals a remarkably ambiguous statute. It
would be equally plausible to suggest that the statute means either (1) an offer —
which occurs within the United States — for sale, or (2) an offer for sale, in which
the sale itself occurs within the United States. The Transocean court decided that
the former interpretation would be inconsistent with United States policies,
because it would “exalt form over substance by allowing a U.S. company to travel
abroad to make offers to sell back into the U.S. without any liability for
infringement.”58
2. Determination of Which Actions Constitute Offers for Sale
To interpret this section, the Federal Circuit also needed to decide which
actions within the United States constitute an infringing offer for sale. It could be
the nationality of either of the parties, the location of the offeror, the location of
the offeree, the location of anticipated delivery, or any location where the offer
“generat[ed] interest in a potential infringing product to the commercial detriment
of the rightful patentee.”59
C. Transocean v. Maersk -- Transocean's Argument and the Litecubes Case
Transocean argued that using the location of the parties at the time of the offer
as the determining factor would be inconsistent with Federal Circuit precedent in
Litecubes.60 In Litecubes, the alleged infringer was a Canadian company selling
56

See 3 MOY, supra note 26, § 12:18 (“Oddly, there are almost no reported cases that deal with
the question of deciding whether the sale of an invention was inside the United States.”); see also
SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 594 F.3d 1360, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“This court has
yet to define the full territorial scope of the ‘offers to sell’ offense in § 271(a)”).
57
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
58
Transocean, 617 F.3d at 1309 (citing 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373,
1379 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
59
3D Sys., Inc. 160 F.3d at 1379.
60
Transocean, 617 F.3d at 1308 (citing Litecubes, LLC v. N. Light Prods., Inc., 523 F.3d 1353
(Fed. Cir. 2008)).
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free on board (FOB) to companies within the United States. In an FOB sale, the
transfer of title takes place before the product arrives at its destination. Northern
Light Products, Inc. argued that there was no subject matter jurisdiction because
Litecubes had failed to show a sale or offer for sale within the United States.61
However, the Federal Circuit in Litecubes held that the country in which transfer
of title takes place is irrelevant when a federal court is determining its own subject
matter jurisdiction, so long as the seller deals with a U.S. customer.62
D. Transocean v. Maersk -- Maersk's Argument/Rotec, MEMC
In Transocean, Maersk argued that the location of the parties at the time of the
offer is the relevant factor, and that the court should follow the precedent set by
Rotec.63 Rotec requires an “ordinary meaning” interpretation of the statute,64 and
Maersk contends that the plain meaning of an offer for sale within the United
States cannot include negotiations in Norway.65 However, the fact scenario in
Rotec is dissimilar to the Transocean scenario in several respects. First, several
parties were involved in the negotiation for sale, not all of whom were based in
the United States.66 Additionally, the final use of the allegedly infringing concrete
conveyance system in Rotec was to take place in the People's Republic of China.67
In Transocean, the final use was to be in United States controlled waters, and both
parties to the negotiation were based in the United States.68
In addition to Rotec, Maersk argued that the court was also bound by the
precedent of MEMC Electronic Materials.69 In MEMC, a Japanese manufacturer
sold silicon wafers to a Japanese subsidiary of a Korean company, which then
sold the wafers to an American subsidiary of the same Korean company for
distribution within the United States.70 The court in MEMC found that there was
no direct infringement.71 Maersk argued that as it was selling to another company
which would subsequently take the infringing device into United States territory,
61

Litecubes, 523 F.3d at 1360.
Cf. id. at 1363.
63
Transocean, 617 F.3d at 1308 (citing Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246,
1258 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
64
Rotec, 215 F.3d at 1255.
65
Transocean, 617 F.3d at 1308.
66
In Rotec, the People’s Republic of China was dealing with companies from the United
States, France, and Japan. Rotec, 215 F.3d at 1249.
67
See id. at 1249 (discussing bids for “a concrete placing system to be used in the Three
Gorges Dam project on the Yangtze River.”).
68
Transocean, 617 F.3d at 1307, 1296.
69
Id. at 1308.
70
MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d 1369, 1372 &
n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
71
Id. at 1377.
62
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it was shielded from direct liability as was the Japanese manufacturer in MEMC.
E. Holding and Reasoning of the CAFC
The Federal Circuit's decision in favor of Transocean placed importance on
the “location of the future sale that would occur pursuant to the offer,” rather than
the location of any particular part of the negotiations.72 The Federal Circuit's
holding, that “a contract between two U.S. companies for performance in the U.S.
may constitute an offer to sell within the U.S. under § 271(a),” required only that
“[i]n order for an offer to sell to constitute infringement, the offer must be to sell a
patented invention within the United States.”73 The court clarified its rule further
by instructing the lower court on remand to determine infringement based on what
was offered, rather than what was ultimately delivered; even though Maersk
modified the rig before delivery to avoid actual infringement, it violated § 271(a)
by offering an infringing rig for sale.74
The court determined that the cases Maersk relied upon, Rotec and MEMC,
did not preclude a determination that an offer by a U.S. company to sell a patented
invention to another U.S. company for delivery and use in the United States
constitutes an offer to sell within the United States75 In Rotec, the court's decision
was not based upon the location of the sale but rather on a lack of evidence that
the United States based defendants ever communicated an offer to sell. 76 MEMC
likewise lacked an offer to sell because the email exchanges between merchants
lacked price terms.77 The court agreed with Transocean that considering only the
location of the negotiations and contracting would run contrary to Litecubes.78
While practitioners of international patent law likely appreciate the Federal
Circuit's attempt to clarify this area of law, the holding referenced specific facts,
which may allow courts to distinguish future litigations from the Transocean
decision. Rotec's holding was written narrowly to the facts, which means it will
be weak precedent and may not clarify the area of law. There are a multitude of
factors that could affect the outcomes of § 271(a) cases, including the nationality
of the contracting parties or the patentee, the location of the offer, the location of
the performance, and the location of the use. Transocean stands for the
72

Transocean, 617 F.3d at 1309.
Id. at 1309 (“We agree that the location of the contemplated sale controls whether there is an
offer to sell within the United States.”).
74
Id. at 1310 n.4 (“[I]n this analysis, the district court must determine what was offered for
sale, not what was ultimately delivered.”).
75
Id. at 1309.
76
Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
77
MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d 1369, 1376
(Fed. Cir. 2005).
78
Transocean, 617 F.3d at 1310.
73
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proposition that the location of the offeror and offeree are not relevant where
delivery and use are to be within the United States and both contracting parties are
based in the United States.79
IV.

EFFECT OF THE TRANSOCEAN DECISION

There are many theories and policies regarding the best way to write and
maintain a system of patent laws. This case implicates several such policies,
including harmonization or convergence of patent laws,80 reducing conflicts of
laws with other nations,81 the national treatment of foreign nationals,82 a desire to
limit the extraterritorial effect of federal statutes,83 reducing the market for illicit
patented goods and price erosion,84 consistency of interpretation of the terms of
the patent statute,85 and the optimum strength of patents.86 Transocean provides
some guidance regarding which policies are given the most weight at the Federal
Circuit.
A. The International Effects of the Transocean Decision
The first few of these policies—harmonization and convergence, conflicts of
law, and national treatment—are inherently international law problems.
Harmonization and convergence are public policies affecting how well the laws of
one nation mesh with those of all other nations. Conflicts of law affect comity
between nations, and negatively affect global commerce.87 National treatment, an
ancient concept, has played an increasingly large role in international commerce
79

See id. at 1310 (holding that an offer made in a foreign country, by one United States
company to another, to sell goods within the United States, for delivery and use within the United
States, constituted an offer to sell within the United States under § 271(a)).
80
See Timothy R. Holbrook, Liability for the “Threat of a Sale”: Assessing Patent
Infringement for Offering to Sell an Invention and Implications for the On-Sale Patentability Bar
and Other Forms of Infringement, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 751, 751 n.2 (2003) (citing Uruguay
Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 101(d)(15), 108 Stat. 4809, 4815 (1994)).
81
44B AM. JUR. 2D International Law § 71 (2011) (“[T]he presumption against
extraterritoriality of federal law is important to protect against unintended clashes between United
States laws and those of other nations that could result in international discord.”).
82
See Michael J. Treblicock & Shiva K. Giri, The National Treatment Principle in
International Trade Law (Am. Law and Econ. Ass’n Annual Meetings, Year 2004, Paper No. 8, at
2), available at http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=alea.
83
44B AM. JUR. 2D International Law § 71 (2011).
84
Holbrook, supra note 80, at 791.
85
3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1379 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding that
the “on sale” bar from § 102(b) has a different meaning of sale than “offer to sell” from § 271(a),
so the terms are defined differently).
86
See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, 294–333 (2003).
87
See, e.g., N. Jansen Calamita, Rethinking Comity: Towards a Coherent Treatment of
International Parallel Proceedings, 27 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 601 (2006).
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since the end of World War II.88
1. Harmonization and Convergence of Patent Laws
While related, harmonization of patent laws and convergence of patent laws
have two distinct meanings and goals.89 In order to accurately analyze this issue,
both must be considered.
a. Harmonization
TRIPs is basically a baseline level of IP protection to which the signatories
agree to harmonize.90 Harmonization provides obvious advantages to inventors,91
but United States courts have been reluctant to harmonize directly because
harmonization requires the “substantive policy choice that harmonization of IP
laws is the preferred goal among countries.”92 That policy choice comes with
distinct disadvantages as well; harmonization eliminates the ability to enact laws
that effect societal and cultural values, or to enact laws that are beneficial for the
signatory nation depending on its status as a net importer or exporter of
intellectual property.93 Accordingly, harmonization is a policy that can only be
effectuated by the President or Congress.94
88

Herman Walker, Jr., Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Investment:
Present United States Practice, 5 AM. J. COMP. L. 229, 235 (1956).
89
Randall Rader, Transcript: The Honorable Judge Randall R. Rader, Chief Judge of the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: The Most Pressing Issues in IP Law Today, 2 CYBARIS 1, 8
(2011), available at http://web.wmitchell.edu/cybaris/?p=1080 (last visited Nov. 13, 2011).
90
See, e.g., Alan R. Kabat, Proposal for a Worldwide Internet Collecting Society: Mark Twain
and Samuel Johnson Licenses, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 329, 337–338 (1998); see also Lee,
supra note 10, at 7 (TRIPs effectively sets a baseline for patent law harmonization); Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 320 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33
I.L.M. 1197 art. 28:1 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs] (requiring patents to provide exclusive rights to
the owner such that “(a) [W]here the subject matter of a patent is a product, to prevent third parties
not having the owner’s consent from the acts of: making, using, offering for sale, selling, or
importing for these purposes that product; (b) where the subject matter of a patent is a process, to
prevent third parties not having the owner’s consent from the act of using the process, and from
the acts of: using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes at least the product
obtained directly by that process.”) (footnote omitted).
91
Lee, supra note 10, at 19 (“Greater harmonization of IP laws would facilitate the ability of
entities to obtain protection for their IP internationally . . . . It is far easier to accumulate such
rights if most, if not all, of the requirements to qualify for IP protection are substantially the same
among countries.”).
92
Id.
93
See id. at 20 (discussing the advantages of diversity in IP law).
94
Id. at 23 (“If a domestic court were to embrace the goal of harmonization with foreign IP
laws, that decision would involve matters of politics, international relations, and economic and
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b. Convergence
Convergence, on the other hand, consists of “judicial dialogue” and “crossfertilization” of ideas; the courts may and do freely pursue judicial convergence.95
In fact, judicial convergence is a priority of the current Chief Judge of the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Randall Rader.96
It is worth noting that the Transocean court did not cite any foreign law
in its decision.97 This could be an unintentional omission, or a deliberate
cold shoulder. A plethora of cases and secondary sources dealing with
foreign interpretations exists which could have guided the court in its
decision in Transocean.98 In fact, whether intentionally or serendipitously,
the Federal Circuit followed the recent interpretation of the law in
Germany.99 Unfortunately, the opinion in Transocean does not supply
enough tea leaves to determine whether the Federal Circuit is influenced by
the decisions of other TRIPs member states in its analysis of § 271(a).
c. The Worldwide Patent Court
Consideration of the decisions of the decisions of other nations would be
unnecessary if a unitary enforcement scheme existed. Attempts have been made
to create such a single, uniform patent enforcement system. In the United States,
the Federal Circuit has declined to exercise jurisdiction over foreign patent claims
involved in the same controversy.100 Interestingly, this refusal was discretionary
based on judicial efficiency, and the Voda Court seems to retain the power to
adjudicate those claims if it chooses.101 “The sort of worldwide patent court that
Voda wanted is an end goal for many involved in substantive patent
harmonization.”102
Subsequently, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act
social policy more suited to the legislature’s and Executive’s competence.”).
95
Id. at 14–15.
96
Rader, supra note 89, at 7 (“I seek judicial convergence. I seek awareness where judges
making decisions on similar issues, maybe even with similar patents and similar parties around the
world can consult, learn, and, to the extent possible, reach results that are consistent with each
other.”).
97
See generally Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA,
Inc., 617 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
98
See, e.g., Marketa Trimble, Extraterritorial Intellectual Property Enforcement in the
European Union, 18 SW. J. INT’L LAW 233 (2011).
99
Id. at 8 n.37 (stating that offers to sell can be infringing in Germany).
100
Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 903 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that the court should
decline § 1367(c)(2) jurisdiction when the foreign claims “predominate” over the claims which
give the court original jurisdiction).
101
Id.
102
Dennis Crouch, The Court’s Future Role in the International Harmonization of Patent
Laws,
PATENTLY-O
(Sept.
13,
2011,
11:00
PM),
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expressed Congress' intent to “promote harmonization of the United States patent
system with the patent systems commonly used in nearly all other countries
throughout the world with whom the United States conducts trade.”103
Europe has been somewhat successful in its harmonization efforts; there
is a unitary European Patent Office but patents are still granted by national
patent offices, and efforts to create a European Patent Court, while
perennially suggested, have so far been stymied.
2. Conflicts of Laws with Other Nations.
Sovereigns enact and enforce their own laws with varying levels of
extraterritorial scope. For example, there are five recognized principles that guide
nations in proper assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction in criminal cases.104
These principles allow for extraterritorial reach for events which occur in their
territory, events in which their citizens were the actors, events in which their
citizens were the victims, events which affect the independence or security of the
nation, and when the nation has custody of the offender. 105 If these principles are
applied inconsistently or illogically, biases will emerge wherein it may be possible
to avoid consequences for one's actions through forum shopping.
The Transocean decision creates the potential that United States patent law
will come into conflict with the laws of foreign jurisdictions. “One of the main
purposes of the presumption against the extraterritorial application of laws absent
congressional direction is to prevent discord between the laws of different
nations.”106 Of course, almost all commerce in the world takes place in TRIPs
signatories and countries that are in negotiations to become TRIPs members.107
Since TRIPs requires that member countries prohibit offers for sale,108 the laws of
foreign nations should be generally the same as § 271(a). Problems may arise if a
nation exceeds the baseline set by TRIPs, or if nations adopt broad extraterritorial
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/09/harmonization.html.
103
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, Pub L. No. 112–29 § 3(p), 125 Stat. 284 § 3(p)
(2011).
104
Harvard Research, supra note 19.
105
Id. See also Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882, 885 (5th Cir. 1967).
106
Motion of The Canadian Chamber of Commerce and The Information Technology
Association of Canada for Leave to File Brief as Amicus Curiae & Brief of Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioner, Research in Motion, Ltd. v. NTP, Inc., 546 U.S. 1157 (2006) (No. 05-763)
(citing EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)).
107
According to the WTO’s website, 97% of the world’s commerce occurs in or between
member
states.
The
WTO
in
Brief:
Part
2,
WORLD
TRADE
ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/inbrief_e/inbr02_e.htm (last visited Nov. 23,
2011).
108
TRIPs, supra note 90.
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jurisdiction.
For example, a nation may implement the TRIPs agreement in such a way that
an offer for sale occurs when the offeror or offeree are present in that jurisdiction.
In that case, a single offer for sale (wherein delivery is to take place within the
United States) could constitute infringement in both the United States and in the
country where the negotiations took place. Additionally, since the TRIPs
agreement sets a baseline that is ambiguous as to what constitutes an offer for
sale,109 a foreign court may interpret the provision differently, limiting its own
statute to its own boundaries. This would mean that an offer for sale negotiated in
the United States for delivery in such foreign country would expose the
contracting parties to no repercussions. The Transocean decision effectively
forces every other jurisdiction to define offers for sale based on the location of
delivery, or face the possibility of international actors arranging for delivery in
foreign jurisdictions to avoid any liability for offer-for-sale infringement. After
all, there is no recovery under Transocean for offers for sale made from within the
United States to be delivered in that other jurisdiction.
The Transocean court faced the question of how to construe the statutory
language of § 271(a); it could prohibit an offer for sale when the offer occurs
within the United States, or it could prohibit an offer for sale wherein the sale
occurs within the United States. In opting for the latter interpretation, the Federal
Circuit ignored prescient language of Judge Dawson when he asserted in 1955
that:
We in this Country undoubtedly would be outraged if American
companies having branches in foreign lands were faced with the
possibility that the Courts of all these lands would assume
jurisdiction to determine the rights of the American company in its
home land to trademarks, copyrights, or patents granted or
registered under the laws of the United States.110
The decision to expand or reduce the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the patent
statute, with its profound effects beyond United States borders, should be the
purview of the executive and legislative branches, which can and have provided
for extraterritorial scope of a statute when they believed it was appropriate.111
109

TRIPs, supra note 90.
Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co., 133 F. Supp. 522, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), modified, 234
F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956).
111
See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991), superseded by statute, Civil
Rights Act of 1991, § 109(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1077 (1991), (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(f) (2006)), as recognized in Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006) (presumption
against extraterritoriality of federal statute unless explicitly granted by legislature).
110
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The Transocean decision could conceivably create conflicts of laws with other
nations, but the treaty obligations placed on TRIPs members mitigate that
possibility. However, international patent law is still far from uniform.112
a. Transocean Creates the Potential for Overlapping Jurisdiction with
Japan.
In Japan, a court should exercise jurisdiction unless “there exist special
circumstances that would make court proceedings in Japan violate fairness
between parties and the idea of proper and expeditious court proceedings.”113 In
2003, the Tokyo District Court heard K.K. Coral Corp. v. Marine Bio K.K. K.K.
Coral Corp. [hereinafter “Coral”], a Japanese company, was exporting coral
powder to dealers in the United States as dietary supplements. 114 Marine Bio
K.K. [hereinafter “Marine”], another Japanese company, held a United States
patent on coral powder and sent warning letters to K.K. Coral's distributors.
Coral sued Marine under Japan's Unfair Competition Prevention Act, alleging that
Marine is not entitled to injunctions on Coral or its distributors, and that the U.S.
patent Marine owned was invalid. Marine argued that the Japanese courts have
no jurisdiction to issue the requested injunctions, and that even if the Japanese
court has jurisdiction, those injunctions would not be enforceable in the United
States. The Japanese court held that, out of respect for the convenience to the
litigants, Japanese courts should assume jurisdiction.115 As Coral and Marine
were both Japanese companies, the court held that it would be fair to exert control
over the controversy.
Clearly, patentee Marine may sue the United States dealers in United States
courts. As the United States courts are under no obligation to follow the decision
of the Japanese courts, they will likely arrive at different results in the two
jurisdictions.
In that case the dealers, Coral, and Marine would face
contradictory, binding orders from two court systems.
Additionally, this expansive interpretation of a sovereign's jurisdiction, in
which the convenience of the parties is rated higher than the right of each nation's
control over its own laws, stands in direct contradiction to United States
112

See supra Part IV.a.1-2.
Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho [Tōkyō Dist. Ct.] Oct. 16, 2003, Hei 14 (wa) no. 1943, 1151
HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA] 109 (Japan).
114
Id.
115
Id. (“Whether or not our country has international jurisdiction over a given case should be
determined logically in light of fairness between parties and for the idea of proper and expeditious
court proceedings . . . . Unless there exist special circumstances that would make court
proceedings in Japan violate fairness between parties and the idea of proper and expeditious court
proceedings, our country should accept international jurisdiction over such a case.”)
113
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precedent. In 1918, the second circuit heard a case involving application of the
laws of Ecuador and held that it was “incontrovertible . . . that our courts . . . will
not adjudicate upon the validity of the acts of a foreign nation performed in its
sovereign capacity . . . .”116 This creates an enormous discrepancy between the
strength of Japanese and American patent law.
b. Transocean Creates the Potential for Overlapping Jurisdiction with
the Netherlands.
The Netherlands has a uniquely belligerent attitude towards the principle of
extraterritorial restraint, perhaps as a result of its extraordinarily open economy.117
The Netherlands adjudicated intellectual property claims, issuing judgments it
claims to be valid in Belgium and Luxembourg, since 1992.118 Its holdings have
grown in scope, and it now asserts the right to be the patent enforcement court for
all EPC patents,119 and in fact foreign patents generally.120 In Lincoln v. Interlas,
the Court stated that its assertion of rights to adjudicate foreign patents is based on
concern for its own nationals—if a Dutch patent were infringed abroad, “the
Dutch injured party would be compelled to go to court in every country
concerned.”121 Unwilling to allow Dutch companies to suffer this burden, the
court system instead “graciously” opened its doors to any patent claim that even
remotely affects the Netherlands. This patent enforcement scheme creates the
potential for double jeopardy, wherein a patentee may seek redress for an offer for
sale in the United States after a suit for the same offer for sale in the Netherlands.
In such circumstances, the Netherlands' courts may accept jurisdiction over the
suit even where the delivery is within the United States.
3. The Transocean Language Leaves Open the Possibility of Failure to
Provide National Treatment.
The Transocean court emphasizes two factors: first, the location of the actual
contemplated sale, and second, that the parties are based in the United States.122
116

Hewitt v. Speyer, 250 F. 367, 371 (2d Cir. 1918).
As determined by the Economist Intelligence Unit in 2009, the Netherlands is the world’s
8th most open economy. An open economy is one which has a high ratio of trade to gross
domestic property, high trade openness, and few if any trade barriers.
118
John R. Thomas, Litigation Beyond the Technological Frontier: Comparative Approaches to
Multinational Patent Enforcement, 27 L. & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 277, 299 (Winter 1996).
119
Id.
120
Id. at 303 (citing Philips v. Hemogram, the Hague District Court, Dec. 30, 1991, 1992 B.I.E.
1992/80 (Neth.)).
121
Thomas, supra note 118, 299 (quoting Lincoln v. Interlas Judgment of Nov. 24, 1989, HR,
1992 NJ 404 (Neth.)).
122
Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d
1296, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“We hold that a contract between two U.S. companies for the sale of
117
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The second criterion is curious—why would the court expand patent protection
but explicitly limit the extent of such expansion to U.S. litigants? Several
potential reasons are possible, though none completely satisfactory: limiting the
court's assertion of personal jurisdiction, protecting businesses in the United
States, or limiting the holding in this case to its specific facts.
Perhaps the most obvious reason to require the litigants be found within the
United States is that to hold otherwise may extend the Federal Circuit's claim to
jurisdiction.
However, patentee/plaintiffs will necessarily have subjected
themselves to the jurisdiction of the United States, by merit of applying for a
patent therein.123
The problem of limiting the holding to U.S. litigants only arises where a nonU.S. company is plaintiff or defendant. If the limitation to U.S. companies is a
substantive limitation and not just an attempt to hold the decision to the facts
presented, a plaintiff non-U.S. company would be unable to obtain an offer-forsale judgment where a U.S. company would. This violates the Paris Convention,
Article 2(2), which requires national treatment for nationals of all signatory
countries.124
B. Effects of the Transocean Decision on the Policies Underlying the Patent
Statute Domestically.
1. The Effects Transocean Will Have on Limiting the Extraterritorial Reach
of the Patent Statute
The Transocean court initially takes the presumption against extraterritoriality
seriously.125 However, the court held that for purposes of § 271(a), the relevant
fact is what was offered for sale, not what was ultimately delivered. 126 These two
the patented invention with delivery and performance in the U.S. constitutes a sale under § 271(a)
as a matter of law.”).
123
Generally, a sovereign may exercise jurisdiction over any party that “purposefully avails
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits
and protections of its laws.” Hansen v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
124
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 2, Sept. 28, 1979, 21 UST
1583, 828 UNTS 305. “No requirement as to domicile or establishment in the country where
protection is claimed may be imposed upon nationals of countries of the Union for the enjoyment
of any industrial property rights.” Id. Additionally, according to Article 3, even nationals of nonsignatory countries are granted national treatment if they are domiciled in a signatory country. Id.
art. 3.
125
Transocean, 617 F.3d at 1309 (“We are mindful of the presumption against
extraterritoriality.”) (citing Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 441 (2007)).
126
Transocean, 617 F.3d at 1310 n.4 (“[I]n this analysis, the district court must determine what
was offered for sale, not what was ultimately delivered.”).
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assertions, in certain circumstances, are contradictory. A corporation could offer
an infringing article for sale in the United States, which is never ultimately
delivered. In that scenario, the Transocean holding will tear patent law in two
directions—on the one hand, no activity took place in the United States so the
courts will not regulate the activity,127 but on the other, there was an offer for sale
within the United States and the fact that it was never delivered is irrelevant.128
As mentioned previously, this also contradicts the holdings of the Supreme Court
in Dowagiac and Deepsouth.129 This hypothetical offer for sale would still cause
price erosion, and apparently the Federal Circuit decided that this is sufficient to
merit a § 271(a) award.
2. The Transocean Decision Supports the Public Policy Against Price
Erosion
Price erosion is a concept recognized in the federal courts since as early as
1886.130 The term price erosion refers to the “difference between what an item
could have sold for with patent protection and what it actually sold for while
having to compete against an infringing item.”131 A patentee may recover for
price erosion damages by showing that but for the infringer's actions, the patentee
would have sold its product at higher prices.132
One classic case of price erosion involves a situation in which an infringer
promises to sell the patented invention at a lower cost, forcing the patentee to
lower the price of the good.133 The claim requires but-for causation of the price
drop.134
Price erosion can only be eliminated by preventing both sales and offers for
sales of infringing products.135 The courts of the United States do not have the
power to do this completely even if they wished, since they cannot regulate
127
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activities occurring wholly outside the United States.136 The Transocean holding
will stop price erosion due to offers for sale where the site of delivery and use is
within the United States.137 In order to prevent price erosion, the court should
construe its extraterritorial jurisdiction as broadly as possible. Of the two
positions argued before the Transocean court, this decision prevents price erosion
more efficiently.
3. The Transocean Decision Expands the Scope of the Patent Act
The Transocean holding expands those acts that constitute infringement. It is
noted, for example, that completed offers for sale, based on offers for sale
occurring outside the United States, will already violate § 271(a)'s prohibition
against importation of infringing devices to the country.138 The Transocean
decision expands § 271(a)'s scope to include those offers that take place wholly
outside the United States and are not completed.139 Strengthening of the patent
statute in such a way is only justified if the corresponding incentive to invent
exceeds the economic costs of this greater intrusion into the free market.140
V.

CONCLUSION

The Federal Circuit's decision in Transocean makes headway in clarifying an
area of law that has not been adequately fleshed out since the United States
became a party to the TRIPs agreement. The Transocean decision supports
domestic patent policies such as prevention of price erosion,141 as well as
furthering the current court's goal of judicial convergence. 142 However, it extends
the jurisdiction of United States courts beyond the limits traditionally set on
extraterritoriality,143 and creates the potential for conflicts of law.144 It also leaves
open the potential for conflict of laws in nations not a party to or in incomplete
compliance with TRIPs.145 The Transocean decision allows recovery in the
United States when delivery for the offered sale will be in the United States,
marrying the concepts of the secondary market impact with the ability to recover.
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